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ABSTRACT

The impact of social and institutional pressures for governance reform in higher education during the late sixties resulted in many accomodations and constructive changes in institutional policies and procedures. However, with a change in the economic climate and with the advent of collective bargaining a new range of items are appearing on the agenda of trustees. This document reviews recent literature on trustees and examines issues that should concern those who govern institutions of higher education. (MJM)

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J. L. Zwingle and
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

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J. L. Zwingle and
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Therefore I am more than normally grateful to those who helped to bring the project to conclusion. The staff of ERIC/Higher Education extended themselves beyond the call of duty, and they have my warm thanks. I am also grateful to John Nason for reading an early draft of the document.

Many questions about educational trusteeship remain to be probed. In this paper we have tried to report on the current literature and to point toward the need for further analysis.

J. L. Zwingle

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Foreword

The impact of social and institutional pressures for governance reform in higher education during the late sixties resulted in many accommodations and constructive changes in institutional policies and procedures. However, with a change in the economic climate and with the advent of collective bargaining a new range of items are appearing on the agenda of trustees. The authors review the recent literature on trustees and suggest issues that should concern those who govern institutions of higher education. J. L. Zwingle is past president of the Association of Governing Boards and William V. Mayville is a research associate on the Clearinghouse Staff.

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The Need for Lay Governance: A Continuing Debate

Since the mid sixties the topic of trustee action or inaction has narrowed in focus to a question of whether lay governing boards are able to govern at all. A persistent theme has been whether lay governing boards are even necessary. Although most critics agree such boards are both necessary and desirable, their continued existence will hinge upon the answers to some key questions. For example, How can trustee effectiveness be measured? Related to this is the question, What should the role of the trustee really be? Once the role is determined, then the question about what criteria are appropriate for trustee selection should be resolved. This chapter summarizes these and other concerns and provides a framework for the issues facing the governing board.

Aspects of the Governance Problem

In the U.S., academic trusteeship had its origins in relatively small private institutions where the duties of trustees centered on the activities of students and teachers. It is little wonder that in recent years the governing boards of multiversities, with sprawling networks of campuses, colleges, and departments, should be plagued by issues that are seemingly beyond the board's means to handle. The smaller private colleges and universities face issues similar to those of their larger counterparts, except in their case survival may be an overriding concern.

The critics of lay governing boards have made several familiar charges, including lack of clarity about role, poor performance, and even negligence and incompetence. To respond to those criticisms, many institutions have adopted better procedures to inform their various constituencies of immediate and long-range plans and purposes. One method employed to satisfy the need for a more accurate description of an institution's financial viability involves the use of "accountability" procedures. The term accountability has come to stand for the application of cost-effectiveness techniques originally devised in the military and subsequently used by business and industry. In the academic setting this approach allows higher education institutions to closely monitor how their money is being spent, and to determine where it could be spent more effectively to yield the greatest

institutional dividends. The need for this approach resulted from pressures applied to colleges and universities by state and federal legislatures, as well as by budget officers, students, their parents, and other publics.

Trow (1974) believes that pressures for accountability promote various forms of "prescriptive planning" and imply "tighter controls." He believes there is a danger that institutions will lose the ability "to respond to the unforeseen," and will be unable to take into account new developments that call for immediate action. In addition, he believes it "politicizes many educational issues by locating the key decisions in central political agencies" (p. 51).

In the past, the concept of separation of church and state acted as a deterrent to politicization of educational institutions; but with the secularization of most of higher education through the creation of public institutions, higher education has been increasingly viewed as merely another item in the state budget, with no special guarantees of freedom from outside pressures. One commentator accepts as inevitable the diminished role of governing boards of state-related institutions, since he believes these boards will not be strong enough to withstand public control (Epstein 1974).

Others are not so pessimistic about the future influence of governing boards. The Carnegie Commission, in looking at the larger picture, takes the view that governing boards might experience a renaissance of influence and prestige. The Commission holds that lay governing boards are essential to institutions of higher education and stresses that they must maintain their "comparative independence from governmental domination." The Commission maintains that no other collection of individuals, either within or without the institution, can govern as well as the lay board:

> State control, as seen in many nations, tends to become both too bureaucratic and too representative of what society wants; the faculty is not generally chosen for its administrative talents and is divided administratively by its own special interests; the students are inexperienced and transient; and the students and faculty are in certain significant disagreements about influence over academic matters. . . (Kerr 1973b, p. 32).

The central consideration when examing how to rejuvenate boards of trustees is that of how the trustees grapple with the vast numbers of issues that they face in their decisionmaking role.

One of the major reasons for the increased focus on lay governance in recent years has been the turmoil that broke out on campuses both large and small during the middle and late sixties. That and the

spectors of inflation, declining enrollments, and political intervention create an increasingly confused state of affairs. Since about 1965 (one year following the student upheavals at Berkeley), the volume of literature on trustees has multiplied at an unprecedented rate. However, this literature has not entirely answered any specific question satisfactorily, since in the U.S. there has not been anything resembling a national system from which meaningful generalizations can be made. The most recent figures from the U.S. Office of Education show a total of 2,915 institutions of higher education, which can be classified as public, private, research-oriented, liberal arts, two-year, four-year, graduate, and others. (Wade 1973, p. 14, table 2).

While student enrollment is considerably higher in public four-year institutions than in private four-year institutions (senior institutions only), the number of people involved in the governance of the public sector is much smaller (about 2,000 compared to 25,000 for the private). The figures do not include members of coordinating boards and other related groups numbering about 1,000. For the two-year colleges the picture is not as clear. Many of the nearly 900 public community colleges are still administered by public school district boards (see Ingram 1973, p. 8). The total number of board members who govern 155 of the 794 public colleges is estimated to be about 4,000. For the nearly 300 private two-year colleges, the number of board members is estimated to be about 5,000. In absolute terms, the grand total of individuals involved in trusteeship ranges from about 35,000 to 40,000, with approximately 27,000 being members of senior level institutions.

In the public sector there is a fairly steady movement toward identification of the two-year college with higher education; sometimes within the state system itself. In public higher education the trend is toward increased centralization, either through statewide governing and coordinating boards or in the form of increased power to existing coordinating boards. The question remains, What, then, are the common problems confronting these lay trustees and how are these problems viewed by their various constituencies?

The Problem of Authority

If lay governing boards are to experience the renaissance spoken of by the Carnegie Commission, they must have the power to act independently and decisively. Yet, the failure to act has been one of the chief criticisms leveled against lay boards. Professor Manne of the University of Rochester comments that "the most significant characteristic of the modern university trustee is his almost total lack of

real interest in exercising any authority" (Manne 1972, p. 7). He goes on to suggest that "all indications are that the sterilization of boards of trustees will continue. . . ." Another commentator complains that trustees do not actually run our universities, since they spend little time on the job, are not well enough informed about the issues to vote intelligently, and often abdicate much of their responsibility to the faculty (Budd 1974, p. 48).

As to the role of the faculty and the exercise of authority, one faculty member at a conference on faculty participation in governance commented that "governance, including administration, is not the substance of education. Let it be handled by those assigned the responsibility, so that others can get on with more important matters." If this viewpoint is carried to its logical extreme, then institutions are merely vending machines for the benefit of the faculty, the students, or whatever group lays claim to profit from the enterprise. Thus, governance provides only a maintenance function. Underlying this notion is the belief that if the board does its "job," everything else will fall into place. In this way, maintenance (i.e., board action) becomes necessary or urgent only when the machine (i.e., the institution) is thought to need overhauling.

This static view of institutional governance is completely out of phase with what is needed to respond to the dynamic pressures confronting institutions of higher education today. In commenting on the need for professional involvement in governance, Epstein concludes that while faculty should have much to do with internal governance, they "should be more than advisors but less than final arbiters" on matters of public policy and allocation (Epstein 1974, p. 228).

The complaint about nonperformance due to confusion about what role trustees should play is fairly commonplace. Dominguez points out the dual nature of boards of trustees, noting that they are responsible to both the public and the institutional domain. He emphasizes that there is a lack of generally accepted theory about what a board of trustees should do: "The lack of theory means that there are few generally accepted criteria to evaluate the changes which are being proposed" (Dominguez 1973, p. 3). This obviously reflects on the board's exercise of its authority, for if there is hesitation on the matter of role, then there is bound to be a less than satisfactory follow-through in performance. After carefully reviewing the point-counterpoint nature of the trustee's role, Dominguez in the end supports the central importance of the lay governing board—provided it chooses its role and sticks to it.

Selection of Trustees

The crucial importance of right selection for trusteeship is mentioned throughout the various commentaries and is the final point in the Carnegie Commission study on governance: "... acknowledging the importance of structures and processes and the need for their improvement . . . the quality of governance depends, in the end, and above all else, on the people who participate in it" (Kerr 1974, p. 79). Such an obvious point seems hardly worth more than a passing mention; yet methods of selection remain largely unchanged. With the increasing difficulties in the academy, some presidents have acknowledged that inability to recruit adequate volunteer leadership is an increasing handicap. With full recognition of the defects in lay governance, it is clear that the aftermath of campus upheavals of the sixties has not brought about the demise of the lay trustee, although the scope of trustee authority is threatened. But more importantly, academic spokesmen have declared themselves more favorable to lay trusteeship than to any other alternative form of governance. In Thompson's view, "the most important factor . . . will be whether intelligent persons with sensitive appreciation of the value of the university can be attracted to service on the boards (1972, p. 167).

In an ideal sense, no member of a board should represent any constituency (see Heilbron 1974). A good trustee regent serves the public interest by service to the institution and is a symbol of the public interest. With a change in times and circumstances the institution may need a redefinition of purpose and thus a revision of its charter, and to petition for such a change may become the responsibility of a board. Board members must be flexible enough to accommodate such eventualities. One commentator suggests that the best way to avoid "exclusionary claims of any one set of interests" is to encourage pluralism among those chosen to be trustees. Epstein accepts the paradox that there may be no clear-cut solution to the conflict among varying interests, many of which have their own legitimacy but none of which should dominate all others. Thus, he would leave room for "continuous adjustment of power relationships as interests develop and as functions change" (Epstein 1974, pp. 229-31).

A Format for Leadership

Trusteeship seems at first glance a reasonably simple concept: A trustee "holds in trust" something of value for the benefit of another person or groups of persons. In exercising legal responsibility for the trust, the trustee may become, in effect, an administrator. But

the more the trustee becomes an administrator, the greater becomes the threat of conflict of interest. This creates the special difficulties in comprehending academic trusteeship.

The need clearly exists for a closer definition of the role of the trustee. If this is accomplished, then effective and ineffective uses of trusteeship can be identified. In a recent address to the Association of Governing Boards, Clark Kerr concluded that the "period ahead is going to be one calling for more leadership by trustees and more active participation by them" (Kerr 1974, p. 2). The form this leadership takes should revolve around certain longstanding issues, many of which have already taken their place on the agenda of trustees. In 1971, Hodgkinson surveyed the major developments then affecting governance in higher education: the rise of student and faculty influence on internal governance; the increase of external influence; the dawning of unionism; new demands for accountability; and the modifications to governance resulting from all these (Hodgkinson 1973, p. 3). Today, only the pressure for faculty and student participation in internal governance has diminished in emphasis.

More recently, the Carnegie Commission (1973b) issued a study on governance that listed "six priority problems" that are similar to those Hodgkinson identified. They are: institutional independence, collective bargaining, tenure, student relations, management of emergencies, and the role of the board. Another commentator, Cunninggim, developed a list that provides a slightly different stress to these same basic issues. His list includes the need for interdependence, a change in character of governing boards, restoration of confidence in institutions of higher education, provision of good teaching, and provision for other student needs (Cunninggim 1973, pp. 9-14).

In treating the issues confronting lay governing boards, the delineations of Hodgkinson and the Carnegie Commission were synthesized into the following topics, which are examined in chapter 2: the role of the board and the problem of effectiveness, problems related to autonomy, academic tenure and collective bargaining, and accountability. The third and final chapters deal with specific reform issues including board representation, delegation of board authority, trustees as agents of institutional change, and the board as a "corporation." The concluding chapter provides guidelines for the trustee's agenda and considers the nature of trustee effectiveness.

The Board's Role and the Problem of Effectiveness

Board role and effectiveness are interrelated concerns, for when the board determines what it must do, the possibility of achieving goals is greatly enhanced. In a new look at trustee effectiveness, Paltridge and a survey team studied the records of 19 public four-year colleges and universities, comparing data for 1964 with similar data from 1972. Their most significant finding was that "boards undertake a tremendous volume of decision actions in the course of a year's meetings, and that much of this volume consists of *pro-forma* actions on long lists of detailed operational matters." They further found that "the responsibility for policy formulation, long-term planning, administrative guidance, review of performance, and support of the institution in the realization of its goals are frequently given minor attention or left to the initiative of administrators or governmental agencies" (Paltridge 1974, p. 21).

Paltridge points out that while at some of these institutions trustees had reduced the total number of items for action, an equal number had increased their workload; this, however, was not a result of conscious efforts to reform, but instead was due to a decrease in one large agenda item: building programs. He also notes a gradual increase in items concerning educational programs at the institutions.

As to the timing of board decisions, there was no significant change between 1964 and 1972 in actions to confirm as opposed to actions to authorize.

He concludes that

> Most boards could delegate much of the detail they now consider—if they really wanted to do so. If boards are seriously interested in reform, this might be the ideal starting point . . . and might help boards to assume more responsibility in policy formulation and institutional planning (p. 27).

Paltridge's study covers only a sample of the public sector, where boards are smaller than in the private sector and where the full board meets frequently. No comparable study has been undertaken in the private sector. It would be no surprise, however, to find that except for the less frequent meetings of the full board, the range and nature of decisions considered in the private sector would be similar to those of Paltridge's survey.

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Although Gross and Gramsch (1974) indicate that between 1964 and 1971 professors and administrators both "felt a stronger congruence between the actual emphases in their universities and the kind of emphases they felt proper, and found "little change since 1964 in the university power structure," they also noted that "an ominous cleavage" had grown up between outside power brokers (regents, legislators, the state government, citizens) and insiders (chairmen, deans, faculty, students). Their conclusion is that the universities, without radical change in organization or a significant shift of position, have not demonstrated a capacity to cope with the new conditions that come upon them. It would appear the time is ripe for the role of the board and its effectiveness to be more closely defined and modified to fit the existing climate in higher education.

The Carnegie Commission (Kerr 1973b) declares the functions of the board are to hold and interpret the trust, to act as a buller, to arbitrate internal disputes, to stimulate change, to be responsible for the financial welfare of the campus, and to provide for governance. This list conforms to what one might expect in such a summary, except for one item—stimulation of change. While the system of lay trusteeship has been credited with the capacity for innovation in American education—as contrasted to systems directly related to governmental authority—the leadership of a board in producing change is not widely accepted in the academy, nor is it significant in the history of American higher education. Major changes seem to have begun with educator-administrators who had board support. Obviously the authority is lodged with the board, and perhaps the next episode in the history of American higher education will show more performance in this area. Some aspects of this issue can be found in an address by Nils U. Wessel on "Board-President Relationships," a serious and occasionally wry commentary on problems in the division of labor between president and board (Wessel 1974, p. 3-15).

As for the board stimulating change the assumption is generally held that the board should restrict itself to policymaking; yet there appears to be little agreement on the practical consequences of this idea. An attempt to clarify the issue is made by E. G. Bogue and R. O. Riggs (1974) in a discussion of "Institutional Policy and Its Abuses." They draw a distinction among three types of policy: governing, executive, and operating, and call for constant attention to the linkage of policies and procedures at each of the three levels without going to extremes in modification. Thus, they see a prospect for more clarity about ranges of responsibility and avoidance of territorial disputes.

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In trying to judge board effectiveness, the analyst is likely to be caught in a vicious circle. Can one judge board effectiveness apart from administrative effectiveness? Can administrative effectiveness be judged apart from educational productivity? Can either be judged apart from fiscal considerations? And is it possible to use the same scale of judgment for both public and private sectors, for two-year and four-year institutions, for single-institution boards and for system boards?

It is possible for the board itself to respond directly to the question of effectiveness. Within the intent of the charter (or legislation) a board is free to choose its own modus operandi. The general impression is, however, that neither presidents nor boards have deliberated seriously about the question of role and scope for the board. It is not a general question but a specific issue for each board. Bylaws are intended to specify the procedures to be followed by a board; but bylaws are subject to neglect and are frequently out of date. Something more is needed as a current declaration of board-administrative procedures. Does the board choose to manage or does it choose to adopt a policymaking role? From all that has been written, one can reasonably assume the lay governing board will continue to be a part of the structure of postsecondary education for a long time to come. One can also assume that it will be subjected to increasing pressure. Furthermore, it seems clear that aside from the most general of generalizations, board functions will vary considerably depending upon whether they are public (individual or multi-campus; two-year, four-year, graduate) or private (again with qualifications as to size, range, and strength). Finally, it can be assumed that much of the criticism of governing boards arises from a failure to make known internally and externally what role the board has chosen for itself.

The Problem of Autonomy

One of the dangers to the board that is uncertain about its role is an erosion of authority and a subsequent loss of independence and autonomy. The independence of educational institutions is a thorny topic that may never be permanently settled. Institutional autonomy is always relative, approximate, and circumstantial. When funds are adequate and there is no crisis, an institution may seem quite independent; but if there is a shortfall in funds, or a crisis of almost any kind, institutional independence is in jeopardy.

Autonomy in the private sector is never quite the same as for the public sector and freedom of decision in the private sector varies from campus to campus. The leading graduate universities in the private

sector have more independence than, say, church-related colleges with small enrollment, small endowment, and restrictive covenants as to mission and trusteeship. In recent years there have been few tests of independence for colleges and universities in the private sector. An exception is the recent case of Concordia Seminary in Saint Louis, Missouri, where the parent ecclesiastical body found the president to be out of harmony with the doctrines of the denomination, as interpreted by the group in power, and removed him from office.

Naturally, the autonomy of any college or university is largely a matter of human and material resources. In a time of crisis, autonomy can be reduced either by a potential cut-off in funds or by a conflict over regulations. For example, currently under litigation is an independent college of strong religious emphasis, Bob Jones University. At issue is noncompliance with desegregation policies as interpreted by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The case is somewhat unusual in that Bob Jones University receives no federal funds. At stake is the eligibility for tax-deductible gifts, which are in question because the university had not complied with requirements for desegregation.

The private institution of any description is affected by a variety of issues, but for most of the institutions in the private sector, the principal one is that of survival. Although the mortality rate among colleges may indeed be related to the problem of effective trusteeship, it is not the subject of any current literature on trusteeship. It could become so if public funds are made available to the private sector in amounts large enough to affect the seat of control. While the list of closings since 1971 as reported by the Association of American Colleges (The National Council . . . 1974) is smaller than expected, the list may grow as the financial crisis continues. An examination of the list reveals immediately the wide range of circumstances at play in the various institutions.

Issues of trusteeship do emerge as the larger institutions in the private sector take on the look of public institutions, and as smaller institutions are threatened by decreasing enrollments. But these issues concern debates over mission, programs, and personnel rather than over autonomy as such. An example is a church-related school, Union University in Jackson, Tennessee, which accepted in principle a $6-million gift that would have required a change of location, representation of the donors on the board, and a pledge to theological conservatism. Upon reflection, the board rejected the proffer, recognizing the threat of endless debate over two fundamental principles: program mission and autonomy.

Although less than 25 percent of the total enrollment in postsecondary education is left to the private sector, and there are prospects of even greater shrinkages, the private sector still enjoys the greater freedom of action in governance as well as in all other aspects of higher education. But this freedom is seriously limited because of the continual flow of students into public institutions as well as the threat of financial strangulation. Part of the reason for the dramatic change in the distribution of student enrollment is attributable to the public community college, which enrolls about 34 percent of the national total. To what extent those attending community colleges might have enrolled in private colleges had funds been available is uncertain.

Recently, public attention has shifted away from the private sector. In the field of governance, as elsewhere, the role of the private sector must become much more visible or its type of governance will lose significance and appeal along with the rest of the enterprise. Within its sphere, however, the possibilities for demonstration of good practice, ingenuity, and pace-setting can be much further exploited. Considering the fact that accolades for effective trusteeship are rare for any institution these days, the private sector has not yet lost the opportunity to demonstrate new leadership and innovative practices.

As for the public sector, the issue of autonomy is involved in almost every major policy question but is not coupled to survival. Multiple forces are at play upon the public institution, whatever the size, type, or location, in the form of federal funding, statewide coordination, collective bargaining, open admissions, affirmative action, and others. The issue of political intervention, actual or potential, is involved in all these matters. In this regard, the increase in statewide coordinating boards and the growth of multicampus institutions are viewed as providing more access for political interests on campuses and, as such, potentially restrict autonomy.

Political Pressures—If a board loses its autonomy, then other forces will move in to fill the power vacuum. One of the most potent and one to which institutions of higher education are most susceptible is that of political pressure. Lyman A. Glenny and Thomas K. Dalglish (1973) analyzed the status of autonomy in various states and produced a list of cases illustrating significant changes in recent years. There is special treatment of differences between statutory- and constitutionally-based universities, with a commentary on related issues. Although, in general, universities enjoying a constitutional base are in the best position to remain independent of outside control, the authors emphasize that "autonomy rests primarily on the amount of trust . . . between state government and institutions of higher education" (p.

152). Compared to the element of confidence, other factors hardly matter. Yet the authors agree that in times of crisis, the constitutional base is important as a means to minimize damage. Since universities by the very nature of their role are "bound to suffer various degrees of adverse reactions," much of the value of constitutional status may lie in providing time to reestablish public support (pp. 152-53). It does appear that in the public sector the growth of statewide or multicampus systems alone might be enough to sweep institutional autonomy beyond recall. If so, the few remaining public institutions with their own boards, together with the leaders in the private sector, will bear the burden of proof as to whether the difference in governance adversely affects the educational process.

Somewhat earlier William Selden, Glenn S. Dumke, and M. M. Chambers (1971) had sounded this warning. They contend that the push for centralization in the name of economy and efficiency is merely a mask for political control. Martin Trow (1974) sees the same problem from another perspective, once more relating the problem of autonomy to the effect of the vast increase in student population and the inevitable rise of "public interest" groups hostile to the previously dominant, professional interests of faculty. The old consensus, he says, is gone and cannot be recreated. "Participatory forms of democracy" introduce conflicts of interest and of goals that are more easily managed in political than in educational institutions (Trow 1974, p. 17). Because of this, political control takes root. There is agreement among commentators that the rise of political influence in the educational sphere is a threat to the aims of education and is one of the foremost unresolved issues in this period.

While there is a growing apprehension about the effects of centralization on public higher education, there is no evidence in the literature of reaction from the political side. An organization formed to provide communication between elected public officials and the educational community is the Education Commission of the States. The Commission could enhance the position of educators in their continuing problems with the states and with the federal bureaucracy. Its claim is that through improved and formalized communication between the two groups, the public will ultimately benefit.

In the Autumn 1973 issue of the *AAUP Bulletin* a set of four articles, appearing under the title of "The Politics of Public Higher Education," intended to make a "realistic assessment" of conditions in Illinois, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Ohio. Tucker (1973) in his introduction to the articles states that "the answers to the following ques-

tions . . . provide a general overview of the relationship between the public higher education system and state politics":

> 1. What was and what is currently the political role of the several state universities?
>
> 2. What is the relationship of the state's political actors to public higher education in the state?
>
> 3. What is the political role of the statewide coordinating board and in what ways has the creation of the board altered the political role of the universities? [In the case of Nebraska, the question was rephrased to ask why no coordinating board has been created and what the consequences have been.]
>
> 4. What political resources are available to higher education and how can these resources be utilized? (Tucker 1973, p. 286)

Essentially these analysts concluded that institutional autonomy has suffered in each of the states, that governors, legislators and coordinating boards have controlled many strategic decisions, and in this way have deflated the policymaking power of institutional boards. A search for replies to these articles has not produced any denials that this is true.

Coordination versus Independence—One way states have endeavored to promote greater accountability (to state legislatures and the public) and control over the educational process is by coordinating boards. Lyman Glenny and others (1971b) anticipated the effect of coordination on institutional autonomy and produced an analysis that recommended a line be drawn to divide the respective powers and responsibilities of the statewide boards and the institutional boards. They warned that the slow and imprecise workings of the coordinating boards would arouse the impatience of staff members, who would tend to seek ways to take more direct action. With the growth of power at the center, the value of institutional boards would become less apparent, and thus "the chief advantage of coordination [may] have been lost to the state and to the institutions" (Glenny 1971b, p. 12).

The authors offer a list of matters coordinating boards should leave to institutional boards, and they suggest that legislaion might be developed to protect these areas for institutional management: student affairs, with certain general exceptions; faculty affairs (except for general guidelines); staff appointments (extending to selection of board members); travel authorization; educational programs (including research); budget proposals, both capital and operating (although a coordinating board is entitled to make its own separate proposals); contracts for property, services, and related matters; maintenance of civil

order; and negotiations with unions (except for general statewide guidelines or limitations).

In October 1973 the Education Commission of the States received a report from a Task Force on Coordination, Governance, and Structure of Post-secondary Education, which called attention to the need for statewide planning and urged a clear delineation of authority similar to the various layers of departments, institutions, and bureaus (Task Force 1973, p 71). It further urged that "decisions should be made as close to the operational levels as possible." On the subject of independence, the Task Force suggested delegating to governing boards "the management of all operating funds within . . . [the] broad area of . . . authorization, free of pre-audits but subject to appropriate post-audits. . ." (p. xi).

The second "Newman report" spoke in favor of the principle of decentralization, decrying the tendency of federal authorities to create new bureaucracies, and declaring the need for federal assistance to reverse the trend toward centralization (Newman 1974, pp. 59-60). The role of trusteeship is not mentioned in his analysis. Instead, the emphasis fell on the need for incentives to increase faculty responsiveness and the need for direct assistance to students by federal programs through state agencies. However, Newman did address himself to trusteeship at a conference of the Association of Governing Boards:

> Personally, I am skeptical about the idea of central coordination of higher education. Is there any evidence that a centrally directed effort in any form in any area of the social services in the United States has worked well? I don't think so. I favor, and I think my colleagues in the task force favor, thinking seriously about how to create more of a free market structure in education. This might produce the kinds of incentives that encourage each institution to fulfill a responsible, responsive role within a broader system of higher education (Newman 1973, p. 6).

In speaking of the dangers of centralization, Ostar emphasized the threat to state-related campuses arising from the political interests of state governments. Calling for "a balance of powers," he asserts: "If we destroy the viability of the lay board by transferring its responsibilities to organs of government, the public interest will be poorly served indeed" (Ostar 1973, p. 26). Again he reminds us of the differences between higher education and other activities financed by the states, such as highway construction, public health, and so forth, and specifically points to three areas of differences: funding—education receives only 40 percent from tax revenues; function—not designed for execution of direct state services to the public, but more long-term

services, to be measured much after the fact; and vulnerability—subject to serious damage if politicized and subject to damage by sudden changes that would upset program continuity.

Statewide Boards and Multicampus Institutions—The growth of statewide governing boards and the development of multicampus systems indicate that in the public sector individual institutions are increasingly confined to administration by formula. Recognition of the special problems of these boards dates back to the first edition of *State Boards Responsible for Higher Education* by Martorana and Hollis (1960). Perhaps the most thorough treatment of this problem to date was done for the Carnegie Commission by Eugene C. Lee and Frank M. Bowen (1971). Lee and Bowen do not believe branch campuses become like stepchildren to the larger university. Instead, they comment on the lack of substantial interest in interinstitutional programming and long-range planning. The authors recognize that "there is no easy or obvious solution to keeping board members aware of activities at several campuses" (see Heilborn 1973, p. 206). They observe the varying experiences of local boards within a system and note that whether termed "governing" or "advisory" the practices are quite similar and the effectiveness of such local groups is directly proportional to the interest of the executive and his willingness to expend energy needed to develop the usefulness of local boards. The still somewhat recent development of a statewide system in North Carolina specifically provides for local boards, with their responsibilities being clearly designated. In this case, the statewide board is called the Board of Governors and the local boards are Boards of Trustees.

Lee and Bowen conclude that the most striking characteristic of multicampus boards is their similarity to their single campus counterparts—too much emphasis on local affairs for each unit rather than concern for the system as such. They fear that university-wide trustees will not be able to adapt to the functions of planning, coordinating, and evaluation, but will continue the pattern of single institutional governance that they believe "will not survive the 70s." The current pressures on trustees are such that

> [T]he need for vigorous, dedicated, and statesmanlike leadership from a lay board will be indispensable—both to guide the inevitable change and to explain it to a weary and worried public.
>
> But it is unlikely that such leadership will . . . emerge, or be accepted, from public governing boards as . . . presently constituted. New modes of board activity will require new patterns of trustee selection. Both are essential if higher education is to meet the challenges of the 1970s and beyond (Lee and Bowen 1971, p. 27).

Corson joins the previous commentators in specifying the limits within which consolidated boards should function. But he urges something further. To stem the tide of rigid governmental control, he suggests three requirements: (1) better appointments to boards and committees concerned with education; (2) a fresh guarantee of independence for each college or university; and (3) a redefinition of the functions of coordination. He sees a new threat to diversity, "a much treasured characteristic of American higher education," if conformity to a common mold is the unopposed result of political force. But he decries the lack of evidence of innovation in higher education today, a topic which itself is now being examined independently by a number of agencies, including the Association of American Colleges. Corson urges that educators improve their practices and spend more energy in dealing with the forces of state governments (Corson 1973, p. 112).

Academic Tenure and Collective Bargaining

The advent of faculty unionism and the subsequent threat to the older collegial tenure system in higher education has raised questions as to the role trustees should play in matters of collective bargaining. In this sense, faculty unionism can be seen as a threat to institutional autonomy, in that the power to hire and fire is subject to review and even control by groups outside institutional jurisdiction.

To the noneducator, academic tenure might seem synonymous with sinecure, in the past a symbol for protection of irresponsibility and nonfeasance. It was therefore opportune that a special Commission on Academic Tenure (1973) should have been financed to produce a new analysis of the tenure question, popularly known as the Keast report. The Commission recognized the power of the board to involve itself in faculty personnel matters, but urged that a board not intervene in decisions affecting appointments. Instead, they asked that boards make themselves more aware of the principles underlying faculty appointments, suggesting that greater awareness and more effective reportage by the administration would relieve board frustration and forestall confrontations in this area (pp. 28-30). The Keast report concludes with forty-seven recommendations, the essence of which is that by careful adherence to established procedures in the form of better communications and better administration, most if not all situations would be remedied (pp. 270-272).

There have been many instances of boards of trustees intervening in collective bargaining and academic tenure disputes, and many books have been written on the subject. A few months after the

Kreast report, Heilbron (1973) succinctly provided a rationale why, under law, boards may and, in his view, should intervene and occasionally contravene in these matters and cited several celebrated cases of the late sixties in support of his view. In another study, Smith (1973) provides a summary of the new standoff between those who seek immediate solutions to such problems in contrast to those who want to proceed with great caution.

In the private sector, collective bargaining has made no significant gains. However, it goes without saying that collective bargaining is on the increase, especially at public community colleges and public four-year regional universities.

As noted earlier, the basic issues for governing boards center on the potential threat to board authority. Among the many sources available, two recent studies present a full-scale review and analysis of the problem: Carr and VanEyck (1973), and Tice (1973). Within the associations, the Association of American Colleges is host for a special project involving several other national groups to maintain a current information service on development in collective bargaining. Also, the Education Commission of the States is preparing a comprehensive handbook on the subject.

The question remains, how will all these activities affect members of governing boards? Carr and VanEyck recognize that the movement toward collective bargaining will have a profound effect on institutional governance, but feel it will enhance the board's authority:

> Collective bargaining will increase the authority and influence of an institution's governing board at a time . . . when many observers are questioning the continuing usefulness of lay boards. . . . The reason for this countertrend is basic. Collective bargaining is a relationship between two adversaries—management and labor. The governing board is management . . . . [E]merging patterns of faculty collective bargaining show that boards of trustees are exercising authority . . . that might otherwise have been left to administrators and faculty members . . . . (Carr and VanEyck 1973, pp. 250-1).

Two other experienced observers agree with Carr and VanEyck. One is William B. Boyd, president of Central Michigan State University, among the earliest to run the full course of negotiation. In his address on "The Impact of Collective Bargaining on University Governance," he reveals the extent of diversion of administrative energy to problems of negotiation (Boyd 1973). The other is Donald E. Walters, whose report on negotiations in Massachusetts shows a strengthening of board authority under pressures of bargaining (Walters 1973). A volume edited by Tice (1973) is useful as a record

of cases illustrating the range and complexity of issues. These indicators support Carr and VanDyck's point of view, especially as seen in the legal steps taken to reserve to the board ultimate authority in those areas already within their purview by charter or legislation. Further suggestions are that aggressive bargaining will be met by equally strong reaction by governing boards, and that in an adversary situation, the governing board may choose to exert its considerable latent power.

However, it should be mentioned that Epstein sees collective bargaining as just one more factor in the total uncertainty about governing boards, particularly at state institutions, since regents lack the independent funding power necessary to make binding agreements (p. 97).

The future of collective bargaining certainly cannot be predicted from what is now known or even from the speculations and admonitions of those closest to events. The few recent developments only make more specific the nature of the forces in conflict—competing national organizations, competing campus interests, variance of views about the locus of responsibility or power within governance, and an economic outlook that further confuses the issue.

The Carnegie Commission expresses the general view that collective bargaining should not now become the new system of governance for higher education, but simply "an amendment in certain areas." The Commission does grant that history may prove otherwise: "If consensus continues to disintegrate in academic life, then . . . collective bargaining will become more clearly preferable to an otherwise more anarchic situation" (Kerr 1973b, p. 51).

Accountability and Responsiveness

Behind the strong trend toward centralization through statewide coordinating boards and multicampus systems, as well as the rising strength of collective bargaining, are the ideas of public accountability and responsiveness to public concerns. Lack of responsiveness prompts more administrative control and outcries for more accountability. Failure to account to an institution's various publics leads to grievance and litigation.

Governing boards, public and private, are likely to have the problems of being responsive to their constituents' needs before them for a long time to come. Lay boards must either adopt guidelines of their own in advance or expect to be continually on the defensive, meeting each skirmish by improvisation or reliance on available financial or political power.

Responsiveness must also take into account pressures from faculty and students and allow them a special part in institutional decision-making. For example, DeFiore made a comparison of trustee and faculty opinions about the *locus* of major authority. His principal finding was that on substantive matters there is much more agreement between faculty and trustees than generally supposed. The conflict appears to be not over what trustees do, but over who should have the authority. To resolve the conflict, the author believes the responsibility should be with the administration. He finds little fault with trustees, but a major fault with administrators who have not done a better job of interpretation of the data to their constituencies (DeFiore, 1972).

Henry (1973) attributes the new interest in accountability to the seeming disenchantment with the Establishment, economic insecurity, and a lowered priority for education. Since accountability is an aspect of planning, organization, administration, and institutional relations, he proposes more precise usage of the term. Only when an institution's purposes are clearly defined and understood can the term be reasonably applied. He concludes that the confusion among citizens about what should be expected from institutions presents an opportunity for improved communications between institutions and their publics. The next chapter deals with concrete measures boards can take to insure this communication takes place.

Pressures for Reform

The call for reform in lay governance is not new, but it has become more widespread and elicited more public interest than before. Proposals for reform generally relate to changing the composition of the board as to age and representativeness, limiting the scope of board authority by delegating responsibilities elsewhere, and proposals to completely alter the governance structure. Under consideration in this chapter are board representation, delegation of board authority, trustees as change agents, and steps toward reforming the system growing out of these issues.

Board Representation

Industrial boards, along with academic boards are charged with being a closed society, made up of persons of like age and background, and therefore out of touch with the reality of organizational and societal needs. From the standpoint of students, faculty, and minorities, it appears that boards can be legitimate only as their members include proportional representation from all interest groups. The Carnegie Commission comments on this:

> To perform its functions well, the board needs to be independent, free of conflict of interest, competent, devoted, and sensitive to the interests of the several groups involved in the life of the campus. Thus we oppose politically elected officials serving ex officio on boards of public institutions because they both reduce the independence of the campus from state control and introduce a conflict of interest due to their necessary political partisanship; and, since they later act on budgets and other major policies, they have a major opportunity for influence and a major measure of control in any event (Kerr 1974, p. 33).

The Commission opposes having faculty members or students serving on the board of the institution where the faculty member is employed or where the student is enrolled on grounds of conflict of interest, and doubts whether truly representative opinion can be determinted where this is the case. However, the Commission does favor inclusion of faculty members and students on committees of the board or on parallel committees. The Commission speaks for a variety of persons to serve on governing boards, but urges the importance of impartiality as against representation of special interests, whether internal or external: "Since many boards do not meet the principles we recommend, they are due for a reformation . . . as well as for a

renaissance of their influence" (Kerr 1974, p. 34). And a faculty commentator underscores this idea:

> Regents are now beset from both sides. The public's interest, not just the public's tax support, has grown, and it has become more diverse. State officials respond to this interest, but they also significantly stimulate it and give it political focus. From their standpoint, regents may seem too heavily identified with the university to be readily accepted as representatives of the state. If regents are not identified with the university, however, they become absentee landlords in the eyes of the academic community. A modern faculty is especially unready to accept the credentials of lay citizens to govern their specialized professional affairs. Neither set of difficulties is entirely new. But the difficulties, in principle and practice, are now harder to solve through regent authority. Proposals for changing board membership, while sometimes useful in broadening representation, do not promise much help with the basic problem of trusteeship. Plans to load a board with educators, or with those chosen by educators, can destroy trusteeship altogether (Epstein, p. 9).

Another useful statement on this topic is by Stanley O. Ikenberry (1971). He is concerned with the inevitable tension resulting from the independence required by high-level professionals versus the necessity of some structure of authority. Ikenberry recommends a reorganization according to task-oriented units that would more clearly indicate lines of accountability and control without invading professional independence. He sees this approach as a means to restore the real authority of the president and of the boards, both of which are now inhibited by the diffusion of authority and responsibility among the faculty by virtue of departmental organization.

Delegation of Authority

In a brief chapter on principles, Professor Henry L. Mason reviews previous comments on the board and its ultimate power by McGeorge Bundy, Duff-Berdahl, Millett, and John J. Corson, and concludes that

> No argument or principle comes to mind which would entitle a board of trustees to act as the final or supreme authority in all the important affairs of the university—*legal provisions in the board's charter notwithstanding.* All the principles, traditions, and longstanding customs of university government point to the delegation of formal board powers to administration and faculty, and to the cooperation of all the institution's components in deciding on matters of importance to the institution (Mason 1972, p. 27).

He mentions in passing a well-known fact of life—that the faculty can exercise a kind of veto by either quiet noncompliance or somewhat overt obstruction. But his use of the phrase "delegation of

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formal board powers" in the passage above may seem a bit extreme, perhaps representing the wish more than the fact (see Partridge, March 1922 and Pfinster, June 1970).

However, the board must exercise some authority on its own or it is doomed to ineffectuality and perhaps dissolution. On the subject of board leadership, Greenleaf asserts:

> A basic conceptual flaw in the conventional wisdom of institutional structures is the inadequacy—or even absence—of provision for trustees to be a functioning part of the institution's leadership . . . Trustees, for their part, have not seen fit to assert the affirmation and . . . determining role for themselves which is required both by their legal obligations and the socio-ethical burden of public trust which they carry (Greenleaf 1974c, p. 2).

On the issue of management Greenleaf notes that "in most instances, the laws of incorporation clearly establish . . . that the institution 'shall be managed' by the board. . . . The role of the board is to stand outside the active program . . . and to *manage*: what they delegate . . . is *administration*" (Greenleaf 1974c, p. 3). Another commentator, Pocock, also sees a distinction between management and administration, but introduces a third component element, that of leadership. He assigns the leadership role to the president of the institution, with the board having responsibility for policy management and the president and his staff handling the administration. However, Greenleaf (1974c) believes that "anyone can lead; there is no single chief executive officer." After differentiating among trusteeship (management), administration, and leadership, he recapitulates the model as follows:

> [T]rustees as a body are legally in charge, and they *manage* the institution. *Administrators* operate the institution under goals and general policies set by trustees and from an *executive* office designed by trustees (Greenleaf 1974c, p. 5).

Greenleaf breaks the management responsibilities of the board into four areas: goal-setting, appointment of executives, assessment of performance, and actions proceeding from assessment. In a large institution, the chairmanship may be a fulltime job, and the trustees will need support from a staff of their own that includes consultants. It has been determined that the turnover in board membership is about 15 percent a year for both public and private institutions. In four years most boards have a majority of new members. In the turnover, however, there is nothing to insure a change in outlook or performance except the decision of a president, a chairman, or someone else capable of doing so.

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Greenleaf assumes the necessity of recruiting new persons for trusteeship, along with special training for the chairman, and a total reorientation of the board. He also warns that the trustee function is in atrophy, to the detriment of institutions and society, but adds that if trustees will assume their responsibilities, they can become agents of new creativity, of restored confidence, and of support.

Trustees as Change Agents

Boards of trustees/regents are sometimes attacked for failure to "turn the system around." One such suggestion is made by Newman as part of his plea for massive changes:

> Whether you agree or disagree with the concept of an education market, I think it is part of your role as trustees to think about and to develop the mechanisms of governance for the total system. Who else but trustees have such a clear responsibility? Who else is reasonably objective? (Newman 1973, p. 6).

Newman, after making clear his interest in public policy, confirms the fear of some trustees and presidents that he and his sponsors at HEW, along with many others, regard higher education institutions as a major obstacle to change. One exception to this was the great surge of interest in the natural sciences and mathematics at colleges and universities in response to the challenge of Russian technology. Of course, this response was accompanied by the outpouring of federal funds to support research in these areas. In this case the issue was easy to comprehend and presented a clear target with measurements at hand.

The great unsolved issues of mass education, however, do not so readily yield to a concerted attack. Neither do faculties and administrators readily change curriculum, admission policies, and indeed the whole apparatus of institutional life in response to public outcry, whatever the source. The extent therefore to which trustees should assume the role of innovators or pressure groups for innovation is not a simple matter. The free-standing liberal arts college may have been the first great innovation of American higher education, with a history extending from the earliest colonial days to the present time. And it should be remembered that the American system of lay trusteeship emerged in strength from these institutions.

There have been perhaps two further major innovations in American higher education—the land-grant college and the community college (approximately a century apart). The land-grant college is now established, but is not greatly distinguishable from its forerunner, the state university. But certainly it succeeded in its mission—the enlarge-

ment of educational opportunity and the enlargement of the curriculum. In the same manner the community college is on its way toward success of a similar kind. Granted the need for flexibility in institutions, it is a live question whether great national problems impinging on education do not indeed require new groupings of forces. Thus, the proper course may be the development of new institutions, rather than a sudden demand that established institutions solve problems for which they have no real aptitude.

It might be reasonable to say that trustees can best serve as stimulators of change by insisting on intelligent periodic inquiry into educational programs, requiring those in authority to be alert without becoming opportunistic. At stake is the question whether educational institutions can be equated with public utilities, subject from year to year to shifting public demands, however expressed, or whether they can be granted maximum latitude in pursuing purposes of their own, assuming a certain basic clarity of goals and conformity with declared long-range intent. Here the function of the institutional trustee is clear enough.

There is a new vogue of limiting terms for presidents, of setting up formal evaluation of presidential performance. The consequences may be good, but only if boards of trustees or regents understand that they too are involved in the evaluation. The president is chosen by the board, reports to the board, and is subject to the board. If there is failure or a need for redirection, the board (as well as faculty) must assess its part in the situation.

To make such an evaluation useful, the board as a corporation must organize to get the job done. Its procedures, including by-laws and agendas, must address adequately the needs of the institution. The selection, orientation, and deployment of trustees must be periodically reviewed if vitality and purpose are to be sustained. These are not simple matters and will not yield to simplistic or casual measures.

Steps toward Reform

A resolution of the problem of effectiveness of governing boards awaits the design of adequate instruments to measure this effectiveness. All commentators affirm the urgent need for improvement in board performance and various proposals have been pushed for changes in the composition and procedures of existing boards. There is some evidence that here and there changes have been made, apparently as a response to pressure; however, there is no evidence of enthusiasm among trustees themselves for substantial reform or readiness to apply a test of effectiveness. It is possible to find a few outstanding examples of change—Princeton University, Carleton College, Vanderbilt, Cornell University, and a few others. The addition of students to the boards of state-related institutions is still a popular issue with students and with a number of legislators and governors. However, the favorable attitude of public officials is apparently from political impulses rather than from a defensible rationale based on educational concerns. One clear road to assessment and potential reform in board performance has been identified in an institutional report at The George Washington University. The Commission on Governance in 1971 recommended periodic formal review of board performance (The George Washington . . . . 1971, p. 14).

Need for Periodic Review

It is noteworthy that one aspect alone in all the educational structure is exempt from scrutiny—the governing board. Legally, the only authority for such scrutiny lies in the power of the state that granted the charter. Until governmental authorities are petitioned to investigate a governing board, it continues as a self-judging group. The fact is that, short of some major crisis, assessment and reform must come voluntarily from the group itself.

Regional accrediting agencies occasionally include recommendations affecting governing boards. Outright malfeasance can be counteracted by accrediting agencies more immediately and effectively than by other groups. Action by accrediting groups, however, are naturally restricted to unusual, even dramatic shortcomings and are not likely to be the source of widespread improvement. True, the Middle States Association of Schools and Colleges through its Commission on Higher Education has adopted and once revised a statement on the role of govern-

ing boards. It is, however, another admonition. More significant are the workshops on institutional improvement conducted by the Middle States Association.

Until governing boards themselves decide on their own initiative to maintain a program of evaluation and improvement, advice offered from outside will continue to float about but will continue to be gratuitous. It is bitterly ironic that one of the early statements on governance was the product of the trustees of Columbia University popularly known as "the Paley report" (for its chairman, a corporate executive and outstanding citizen). But when the great student revolt hit Columbia in the sixties, the Paley report signified little. When the board was put to the test, it was unable to meet the crisis with any sense of statesmanship or self-assurance.

The University of Pennsylvania some two decades ago undertook a massive self-study with competent professional guidance and ample funds. One of the analyses produced in this large-scale institutional study concerned the board of trustees. While significant changes have occured at that university, it is difficult to trace a line from the report on the governing board and the events of today. It is fair to assume that the pressures of the late sixties produced more changes, for better or worse, than did the earlier self-study.

Since governing boards in the private sector are largely self-determining, and since those in the public sector are elective or appointive, one may well wonder whether any significant change from within can be expected. Presidents are not likely to propose to their employers that the employers reform. Members of a board may privately concede the need for change, but seldom will one or more of them take the initiative.

The only reasonable hope appears to lie in the possibility of a few good examples yet to be set. A board that will adopt a standing regulation calling for periodic, outside appraisal, with the result made a part of the record, can set a new pace. Otherwise, change will occur only when emergencies erupt or when the accumulation of bad practice or inefficiencies finally make action necessary. While consulting firms are busy with many clients and there is a degree of activity here and there, the record appears to be that boardmanship continues from year to year in *pro forma* style, veering from torpor at one stage to crisis at another.

The Corporate Nature of the Board

A preliminary consideration, concerns the prevailing mood characterizing a board, that is, the typical self-perception. If the members

of the board see themselves as a collection of individuals, each acting as an individual "trustee" or "regent," the work of the board is made difficult. If the members see themselves as a sounding board and authenticator for the administration, the consequences cannot be very good. If the members see themselves as *de facto* operators, the consequences are likely to be pretty bad.

The first consideration should be to establish the reality of "corporateness." Whether by private charter or by statute or by constitutional provision, the board is a corporate body (see Perkins). A sense of the corporation, of the body as a whole, is the first essential and apparently the most lacking. This sense of corporateness among the members of the board should extend to administration, faculty, and students.

Unfortunately, the term "corporation" implies legal technicalities. For the academy, however, it needs to be just the opposite. There is a serious shortcoming among lay trustees in failing to grasp the difference between their role as members of a corporation and as private citizens. In both the public and private sector, board members have been known to speak out on institutional matters with no concern for the board as a whole or for the chief administrative officer. The same shortcoming causes internal difficulties when board members are not circumspect in conversations among students, faculty, alumni, or anybody with special relationships inside the institution or system (see Wharton 1973).

This line of thought may lead one to suppose that board members should keep aloof from everyone except the president and his staff. Not so! The only requirement is that board members be alert and sensitive to the ambiguity of their position as individuals on the one hand and as board members on the other. In one sense, the individual board member is authentic only when the board or its committees are in session or when he is carrying out some delegated duty. The newspapers frequently carry references to dissent among board members based on an ill-advised interview.

In a commercial or industrial setting the sense of corporation is more easily grasped. The board member has more clearly defined goals and means of assessment (although even there criticism is mounting). In the public domain, the demarcations are faint, and there is greater need for background, orientation, sensitivity, a sense of timing, and a sense of value. In education, the corporation is a legal necessity, a defined *locus* of responsibility, and the holder of property and of funds.

Beyond this legal function there extends the whole terrain of personal intent, mood, and performance by board members. The newer institutions reflect one aspect of this problem. It would perhaps be unwise to single out specific examples, yet the recent history of certain institutions raises questions to which there are no ready answers. In Washington, D.C., two new institutions were established, one of which (Federal City College) became the subject of unfortunate publicity, with president succeeding president, and the board reported as being contentious over policy and operations. At the same time, the other institution (Washington Technical Institute) proceeded with small public notice to establish itself as a going concern with a minimum of administrative friction and a maximum of public acclaim. When both institutions are publicly supported, the differences in the two developments give ground for inquiry whether the board of the first institution was doing its work.

In the private sector, a major university undertook a radical change in both program and enrollment, was succeeding, and then fell victim to external conditions that no one foresaw. It seemed headed for bankruptcy but pulled around. It appears to exemplify good corporate performance in adversity.

It is also known that in certain states the electoral process produces different types of board personnel and performance from institution to institution. Why the difference?

These allusions serve only to dramatize our lack of knowledge. But the questions need to be asked if answers are to be found. Poor performance begins somewhere. It continues or changes for some reason. It must not be a matter of chance that some institutions develop a system that works well through good times and bad. It must not be a matter of chance that other institutions are in continuous difficulty. But what needs to be known, and is not easily ascertained, is the contribution of "the corporation" to this success or failure.

In developing the sense of corporateness in a public board, there is a special handicap in the requirement that meetings be open to the public. Designed to prevent undue secrecy in what is considered public business, the requirement often leads to problems. For example, freedom of expression in board meetings often leads to a human interest story that is reported in the press but is of dubious service to the institution. Also boards populated with persons of predominantly political motivations, and with *ex officio* representation from the state, find themselves in an insufferable situation. A sense of the corporation is certainly hard to achieve under such conditions.

In the private sector there are comparable difficulties. Lack of time and lack of serious commitment are major obstructions to the development of tone required for good corporate demeanor and the setting of priorities.

Responsibility for Educational Mission

To nurture a sense of the corporation there must be among the members of the board a willingness to acquire a reasonable understanding of the educational program of the institution or the system, its history, its reason for being, its current array of problems, its short-term outlook, and their relationship to it. This is the kind of orientation and commitment most often said to be missing. A common complaint of presidents is that trustees/regents do not understand the difference between the educational enterprise and other corporate or political enterprises.

Underlying the difficulties of establishing a corporate mood and outlook is the problem of defining educational mission for the college or university. It is a commonplace observation that some people on governing boards have fixed ideas about education and about their institution, ideas of such variety that it is little wonder presidents prefer to keep board members busy with more immediate details. In the long run, however, this is a sure route to trouble. Long-range substantive matters should have a definite place on the agenda of governing boards regularly enough to create a sense of substance and purpose seldom possible in the typical board meeting. Such discussion could easily center on a major concern for governing boards, such as a careful discussion of "education and national manpower development"(See Bowen 1973).

President Harold C. Martin of Union College (Schenectady, New York) discussed the importance of bringing educational policy into the board meeting, and effective ways of avoiding pitfalls, in an address before trustees of colleges and universities in New York State:

> An informed perspective is, in sum, the key to the role trustees should play in college and university affairs, whether the matter is an academic one or not. It is especially important in academic matters, however, because it is on them that their authority is most likely to be challenged. Trustees must indeed be accountable to faculty, in ways I have tried to make specific here, but they must also be accountable to others, and that second accountability is one they can't satisfactorily perform unless they accept the work that goes with it and the often unpleasant decisions it entails. If they do, they have indeed an important role to play in the academic affairs of the institutions, and they should not permit any argument about exclusive domain to deter them from playing it (Martin 1971, p. 4).

Plurality of Roles

In an early volume on administration, Chester I. Barnard first explained what now is obvious to all students of administration, that an executive plays multiple roles (Barnard 1938). It would be useful if among trustees/regents there were a sharper consciousness of their own plurality of roles. In attempting to label the variety of roles open to boards of control, the following list is suggestive but not exhaustive. From time to time, a board may serve as

- the legal corporation,
- the supreme court,
- the board of managers,
- the board of inquiry,
- the emergency corps,
- the underwriters,
- the society of friends,
- the stabilizers,
- the directors (planners),
- the energizers.

The order of the list is from the least important toward the most important, without precise gradation. The important point is the degree of conscious separation between these or other categories as a board moves through its agenda. If such a thing were feasible, boards would profit from the opportunity at a single meeting to deal only with certain selected categories. Boards would further profit from the use of an agenda for the year, each meeting being devoted as far as possible to the special categories reserved for that meeting.

In speaking of reform in governance, particularly in trusteeship, one must remember what is at stake and what is the present division of the territory. The percentage of students enrolled in public higher education (76 percent) is not a monolithic figure. To the contrary, about 33 percent of the total are now enrolled in two-year community colleges, and the trusteeship of the community college is of special importance to the nation. Aside from the numbers now enrolled in the public two-year college, the imbalance between the public and private spheres is considerably changed. (Subtracting the 33 percent enrolled in the community colleges from the 76 percent total enrollment in the public sector leaves a total of 43 percent for the public senior institutions versus 24 percent for the private sector.) But a change in the enrollment numbers does not change the problem. In the community college sector, problems of governance are not the same from state to state. To get an idea of the total problem of generalizing about gov-

erance, begin with the concentration of community colleges in just a few states; then consider the differences of governance from state to state, and so on for the senior colleges and graduate institutions.

From everything that one reads (and hears) the lay governing board urgently needs restyling, redesign, and repopulation. The process must start somewhere. In the public sectors, probably the governors must be the instrument of change. But within the boards themselves a new compact is needed. To encourage the corporate nature of trusteeship a developmental outlook must be cultivated. Because education is a developmental activity and colleges and universities are developmental institutions, trustees and regents are essentially responsible for a process rather than for money and property. Concentration on process will provide a focus. Concentration on the enterprise of education will hold in check bureaucratic procedures that become hinderances to reform (see Hefferlin 1970).

Conclusions

From a 1974 survey, it appears that a decided number of board chairmen are undismayed by the problems they confront, especially those of academic planning or of collective bargaining (Association of Governing Boards 1974; see Appendix A for the complete survey results). They agree that the role of the president is no less important than in times past. They also believe that good relationships between board and president can be systematically developed rather than left to chance. Finally, a strong majority believe that the shortest route to developing a strong board is through the work of a strong president. This is indeed encouraging news. More so when a small majority relate recent attempts to evaluate board performance. Almost half the respondents reported that the board had held a special "retreat" for the careful review of leading issues of institutional policy.

Despite this encouragement, trusteeship in general has not undergone major change since the 1971 report of Hodgkinson cited at the beginning of this paper. Admonitions and guidelines have reached a saturation point. New information is needed, especially about effective performance and how it was achieved. In the private sector, the initiative lies with presidents and chairmen. In the public sector, presidents and chairman can try and they can hope that governors and legislatures will do their part, especially if new grounds for confidence can be found.

The justification of lay trusteeship still lies in the realm of theory rather than practice. Recent literature on trusteeship adds emphasis

and some clarity to the views set forth in earlier publications, but adds little that is new either as information or theory. If the basic idea of lay trusteeship is as important as its proponents claim, and if the crisis of higher education is as severe as some believe it to be, it is time for more serious efforts to demonstrate and make known more widely just where, how, and how well trusteeship has served the total enterprise. total enterprise.

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Appendix A: 1973 and 1974 Surveys of Board Chairmen Opinion

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1973 AGB Survey of Board Chairmen Opinion

Before the 1973 National Conference on Trusteeship, the AGB surveyed 1,615 chairmen of governing boards to determine their views on issues relating to the conference theme, THE TRUSTEE AND PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS. Responses were received from 788 persons (49%), representing 182 *public* 2-year, 48 *private* 2-year, 124 *public* 4-year, and 409 *private* 4-year institutions. The type of institution could not be determined on 25 of the replies. Chairmen were asked to indicate whether they "Tend to Agree" or "Tend to Disagree" with the statements and to skip those items on which they had no opinion.

Responses are summarized in the following table (A=Agree, D=Disagree). Differences between combined "A" and "D" percentages and 100% reflect the extent of "no opinion."

CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
Trusteeship, A Changing Concept										
• In actual *practice*, boards of trustees generally no longer have the kind of traditional authority (roles, responsibilities, prerogatives) they once held.	36	59	44	45	40	54	44	51	30	66
• *Legally*, boards have maintained their traditional authority although the way it is exercised may vary in practice.	87	8	86	10	88	8	83	11	89	5
State Aid to Private Education										
• The way must be cleared in all states for state financial assistance if the private sector is to survive.	63	28	42	40	75	25	58	30	73	22
• The threat to institutional independence outweighs the positive factors on the issue of state aid to private higher education.	33	52	41	38	40	52	38	47	27	60
• Private colleges and universities should be efficient and viable without state assistance.	49	38	61	25	24	35	47	35	44	44
The Governance of Higher Education: Selected Problems										
• State governors should have less control over public institutions.	58	24	60	27	56	21	64	27	56	22
• Appointive authorities tend to place the most able people on public institution boards.	29	52	32	57	14	50	48	44	25	52

(Continued)

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CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES (cont'd.)	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
• There is urgent need for a set of guidelines to assist state authorities to identify and place the most able people on boards.	74	13	73	19	71	12	71	19	75	8
Student and Faculty Trusteeship										
• Students should hold membership (voting *or* nonvoting) on their *own* institutions' boards.	28	68	22	76	25	64	23	72	33	64
• Faculty should hold membership (voting *or* nonvoting) on their *own* institutions' boards.	26	69	21	79	33	58	21	74	26	63
• If students or faculty are made (voting *or* nonvoting) members of governing boards, they should be from *other* institutions.	26	42	27	59	21	56	29	57	25	28
• There are alternatives and more effective means of employing student and faculty perspectives on matters of direct concern beside board membership.	81	11	87	9	79	6	81	10	78	13
Higher Education: Who Needs It?										
• The current relationship between college education and the nation's manpower needs is unrealistic and should be improved.	68	15	71	15	67	12	68	18	64	14
• It should *not* be a responsibility of colleges and universities to meet, in any quantitative way, the nation's manpower needs.	24	62	20	68	25	50	24	64	24	61
• It would be extremely helpful (and it would make a difference) to have realistic projections of manpower needs in specific areas to assist with development of academic programming.	86	4	89	4	81	4	89	3	84	5
Statewide Planning and Local Autonomy										
• Institutional independence is in serious danger, more so today than ever before.	43	26	62	21	58	21	59	26	27	30
• The erosion of institutional independence stems *primarily* from — increasing centralization of authority at state levels	26		42		12		38		16	

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CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES (cont'd.)	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
– increasing involvement of the federal government	24		18		35		20		26	
– demands for student and faculty representation on governing boards	8		5		12		8		8	
– growth of unionization and possible statewide contract negotiation	24		31		12		20		22	
• Section 1202 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1972 calls for each state to have a commission to plan and coordinate requirements for federal monies to assist postsecondary education. Many existing state agencies will qualify, with modifications in some instances; in other situations new agencies will have to be established to meet criteria now being developed.										
– Because of increased dependence on federal support, this is a reasonable way to proceed—requiring the states themselves to establish priorities.	56	10	62	9	44	15	60	13	54	9
– This is yet another example of federal encroachment on institutional affairs, at least indirectly affecting the authority of governing boards.	39	25	51	18	48	10	40	23	32	25
The Viability of Lay Trusteeship: Pro and Con										
• Predominately lay boards are no longer appropriate instruments for institutional governance.	6	86	7	87	6	79	6	89	6	86
• Membership of governing boards generally does not represent the various groups served by colleges and universities.	31	58	29	62	29	44	31	65	31	56
• Limitations should be established on board members' ages and terms.	63	32	47	49	58	31	56	40	74	21

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CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES (cont'd.)	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
• Age and term limitations probably have little to do with board effectiveness.	43	50	52	41	50	42	51	40	34	59
• The gulf some see between the board (and president's office) and the rest of the campus community is generally widening rather than narrowing.	26	65	33	59	29	56	30	62	22	68

	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No
• Has a law suit been brought against one or more members of your board as a result of performing in their official capacities, or against the board itself, in recent years?	18	80	26	72	4	92	53	47	5	91
• Does your institution provide an insurance policy to protect individual board members against suits while acting in their official capacities?	24	68	43	50	19	71	27	65	15	77
• Is the board itself protected against class-action suits?	23	63	37	47	12	71	34	52	15	74

Source: Supplement to *AGB Notes*, April 1973, Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, One Dupont Circle, Suite 720, Washington, D. C. 20036.

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1974 AGB Survey of Board Chairmen Opinion

Before the 1974 National Conference on Trusteeship, AGB surveyed 1,663 chairmen of governing boards to determine their views on issues relating to the conference theme, VITALITY WITHOUT EXPANSION: A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES. Responses were received from 599 persons (36%), representing 131 *public* 2-year, 41 *private* 2-year, 86 *public* 4-year, and 314 *private* 4-year institutions. The type of institution could not be determined on 27 of the replies. Chairmen were asked to indicate whether they "Tend to Agree" or "Tend to Disagree" with the statements and to skip those items on which they had no opinion.

Responses are summarized in the following table (A=Agree, D=Disagree). Differences between combined "A" and "D" percentages and 100% reflect the extent of "no opinion."

CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
Vitality Without Expansion										
The financial stringency now faced by many higher education institutions is due in large measure, perhaps predominately, to the inconsistent fiscal policies of the federal government.	28	64	29	63	29	66	24	74	28	62
The financial difficulties now confronting colleges and universities are the result of many factors, but first and foremost they reflect poor resource management.	41	51	40	49	39	51	43	55	41	51
State coordinating agencies must exert more influence to curtail duplication of effort in program offerings and to encourage more cooperation between private and public institutions.	80	14	78	16	95	2	81	13	80	14
Trustees and regents necessarily must be more responsible for helping to assess program needs of students than was probably true in preceding decades.	83	14	88	11	80	17	85	15	80	15
Academic Planning and Innovation										
Faculties should understand that trustees have legitimate prerogatives in educational policy and curriculum areas.	85	10	93	4	80	15	92	8	81	13

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CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES (cont'd.)

	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
Trustees seem to be taking more responsibility for insuring that their institutions' academic programs are meeting contemporary needs and demands.	77	18	83	17	83	15	82	16	73	20
Too much of what are referred to as academic "innovations" are simply new labels for old ideas.	45	40	46	40	56	34	45	46	42	40
Among the more traditional board standing committees, the "education" or "academic policies" committee is probably gaining in its significance to the institution—i.e., its role has become more important in recent years.	70	18	49	24	83	7	77	17	74	16
Board/President Relationships										
The president is most accurately viewed today in the role of a mediator and reactor, rather than initiator or innovator.	26	67	27	64	27	71	32	63	23	69
In general, the position of president has been severely weakened in recent years.	33	61	36	56	32	61	44	52	29	65
The shortest route to a strong board of trustees is through a strong chief executive officer.	74	21	79	18	73	22	71	29	73	20
Good board/president relationships almost defy systematic cultivation.	21	68	19	69	24	68	23	69	20	70
Board/Faculty Relationships										
Such relationships can be enhanced if faculty are given representation on the governing board's key committees.	48	47	49	53	50	36	34	64	53	43
The requirements of dealing with financial stringency inevitably result in adversary relationships between the board and the faculty.	44	51	38	62	49	46	43	46	38	57
Increasing demands of faculty have seriously eroded the authority of governing boards.	29	62	36	53	24	70	35	56	25	67

(Continued)

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CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES (cont'd.)	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
Board/Faculty Relationships (cont'd.)										
Collective bargaining (or its prospects) probably does more to militate against harmonious relationships than anything else at the moment.	65	23	76	16	68	22	65	21	69	27
The matter of equitable determination of optimum "faculty workload" must receive more attention by trustees and administrators than has been true in the past.	82	10	89	12	78	17	91	8	84	8
Alternatives to tenure must be found to assure the economic security of faculty.	76	15	76	13	83	12	70	21	78	13
Toward More Effective Trusteeship										
Trustees by and large are more carefully selected and serve more capably than was probably true a few decades ago.	72	17	58	28	85	10	63	24	78	12
Trends to the contrary, higher education is best served by strong, viable boards of trustees at the institutional (local) level.	90	4	92	2	88	7	85	9	90	2
The position of board chairman has probably gained in significance in recent years, especially with regard to impact on board performance.	76	14	77	16	76	20	67	22	79	11
Individual trustees and boards can be expected to respond positively to reasonable suggestions of criteria for the evaluation of their performance.	87	7	87	9	83	10	85	5	88	6
Trustees and boards are increasingly concerned about their own accountability.	86	8	88	9	73	17	85	3	86	8
Effective Resource Management — Human and Financial										
Increasing tuition at public institutions as recommended by a few national study groups, while it may assist the private sector, would be harmful in the long run.	35	37	58	25	20	61	51	41	21	70

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CONFERENCE TOPICS AND RELATED ISSUES (cont'd.)	Summary		Public 2-yr.		Private 2-yr.		Public 4-yr.		Private 4-yr.	
	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D	%A	%D
One of the clearly positive outcomes of the recent financial plight in higher education is that trustees are more aware of their fiscal responsibilities and do a better job of asking the right questions.	89	4	86	5	95	—	81	6	91	4
Boards should develop a formal policy for the record addressed to the issue of social responsibility and investments.	65	22	70	18	66	22	62	22	64	23

SPECIAL ITEMS	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No
Within the past two years, has your board . . .										
taken measures to increase the effectiveness and contribution of the educational policies or academic affairs committee?	71	24	59	32	83	15	64	27	77	21
conducted, with the chief executive officer, any sort of a "retreat" to discuss in depth key issues bearing on the future of the institution?	46	52	44	51	46	54	51	48	47	53
revised substantially its policy with regard to faculty tenure?	25	72	26	72	22	54	26	71	25	73
attempted to evaluate its performance?	56	42	61	36	58	39	44	51	57	42
attempted to evaluate the performance of the chief executive officer?	63	33	74	26	49	49	60	35	61	35
adopted a formal policy concerning what has been termed "social responsibilities" regarding the institution's portfolio?	21	71	27	62	24	66	15	77	21	74

Source: Supplement to *AGB Notes*, May-June 1974, Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, One Dupont Circle, Suite 720, Washington, D. C. 20036.

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Appendix B: Survey Form Used for Study of Effectiveness of Governing Boards

I. You and Your Institution

1. In what year were you first elected or appointed as a trustee at your present institution? ..... year

2. Your age? ..... Your sex? ..... Your racial or ethnic group? .....

3. Over the past year, about how many days per month did you devote, on the average, to duties or tasks directly associated with your trusteeship? ..... Days

4. What have you found to be the greatest challenge to you personally in your tenure as board member? .....

II. The Functioning of Your Board

1. What quality of the board chairman do you feel is most valuable to you or your institution in his role as chairman? (If you are the board chairman, what quality of the chairman do you feel your board and institution require most?) .....

2. What quality of your institution's president is most valuable with regard to the functioning of the board? .....

3. To what extent do each of the factors listed generally operate in the decision-making process of your board?

	To a considerable extent	To a moderate extent	To little or no extent
a. Firm guidance by chairman	☐	☐	☐
b. Recourse to expert opinion outside the board	☐	☐	☐
c. Active and vigorous debate at board meetings	☐	☐	☐
d. Strong guidance by committees or committee chairmen	☐	☐	☐
e. Individual, private exchanges among two or more key members ..	☐	☐	☐
f. Recommendations by institution's chief administrative officer	☐	☐	☐

* Source: Study of Effectiveness of Governing Boards, Association of Governing Boards.

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g. The simple pressure of the situation and the unavailability of alternative solutions ..... ☐ ☐ ☐

h. "Lobbying" by or pressures from extra-board groups—alumni, students, political bodies, etc. ..... ☐ ☐ ☐

i. First-hand knowledge of the situation ..... ☐ ☐ ☐

4. Does your institution have a long-range plan projecting institutional goals? ☐ Yes ☐ No

How was the board principally involved in the development of this plan?

- ☐ By *formulating* and *deciding* on plan
- ☐ By *advising* and *reviewing* plan
- ☐ By *approving* and *confirming* plan

How satisfied are you with the reasonableness and attainability of the long-range plan?

- ☐ Quite satisfied
- ☐ Reasonably satisfied
- ☐ Somewhat concerned
- ☐ Quite concerned

5. What items have *not* appeared on the board agenda in the last one or two meetings that you feel ought to be discussed? .....

6. To what extent have the following *adversely* affected the functioning of the board in the past two years?

	To a considerable extent	To a moderate extent	To little or no extent
Board structure: i.e., functioning of committees	☐	☐	☐
Leadership style of the board chairman	☐	☐	☐
Failure by the president to achieve effective communication on some issue	☐	☐	☐
Conflict between the board and the president	☐	☐	☐
Difficulty in achieving resolution of a problem that is acceptable to all members	☐	☐	☐
One or more obstructionist members ..	☐	☐	☐
Strong and irreconcilable differences of opinion within the board	☐	☐	☐
Failure of the board to accept and exercise its responsibility as a board	☐	☐	☐
Tendency of the board to exceed its proper role	☐	☐	☐
Absenteeism (from illness or other situation) of one or more members ..	☐	☐	☐

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Too much "dead wood" on the board ..	☐	☐	☐
Challenges from special constituencies (i.e., students, faculty, alumni, minority groups, etc.)	☐	☐	☐
Intervention from outside sources	☐	☐	☐
Lack of experience of some members on boards	☐	☐	☐
Lack of understanding by some members as to how a board should function	☐	☐	☐
Inadequacy of information and orientation materials provided board members with agenda prior to meetings	☐	☐	☐
Devoting too much time to trivial rather than material matters	☐	☐	☐
An "Open Meeting" Law or Practice ..	☐	☐	☐
Others (specify)	☐	☐	

7. Please check any of the following that you feel would improve the functioning of your governing board:

- ☐ Increase in size
- ☐ Decrease in size
- ☐ Replacement of one or more members
- ☐ More attention to or concern with matters of major or long-range significance, including educational policy
- ☐ Better orientation of board members to the institution
- ☐ Better understanding by the board chairman of his role as chairman
- ☐ Improved board committee structure or functioning
- ☐ More systematic reporting by administrative officers and department chairmen on the status of their programs
- ☐ Greater contact with knowledgeable members of other boards
- ☐ More information about and understanding of trends in contemporary society
- ☐ Other (specify .....)

8. A "crisis" for a board may be defined as a situation of serious consequence for or threat to the institution or the functioning of the board, involving issues that are of persistent concern, and that requires unusual effort to resolve. What, if any, such "crisis" has the board experienced or dealt with in the last three years? If more than three, list only the most critical. And, how satisfied are you with the way the board handled (or is handling) these "crises"?

Nature of Crises	Rating of Board Handling			
	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
a.	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	☐	☐	☐	☐

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9. Could handling of any of these crises by the board be improved in the future? If so, how?

.....

.....

III. The Effectiveness of Your Board

1. Below are listed some characteristics that describe different areas of board effectiveness. How would you rate your board *as a whole* on each?

	How do you rate your board			
	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
a. *Diversity:* The board as a whole contains the necessary diversity of talents, skills, experience, and interests among its members to complement one another and to strengthen the whole board.	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. *Structure:* The board is structured in such a way that individuals and/or committees assume a proper, active, and effective role in the operation and activities of the board.	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. *Member Involvement:* Members demonstrate a high degree of interest in the institution and in their role and responsibilities as trustees or regents; they are genuinely involved in the institution's problems and prospects.	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. *Knowledgeability:* The members of the board are well-informed about the institution, its place in the higher education system, and in the currents of society affecting higher education.	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. *Rapport:* The members of the board have mutual respect for each other, regardless of differences of opinion, and maintain an effective working relationship with each other.	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. *Sense of Priorities:* Board members, and the board as a body, tend to be concerned with important and long-range issues rather than with trivial matters.	☐	☐	☐	☐
g. *Direction:* The chairman is respected, strong, and skilled both in making certain that different points of view are expressed, and in obtaining satisfactory decisions.	☐	☐	☐	☐
h. *Sensitivity:* The board is representative of, or sensitive to, different constituencies and viewpoints.	☐	☐	☐	☐

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i. *Strength:* The board is strong enough to achieve effective educational policy decisions in the face of extraneous political or other outside pressures.	☐	☐	☐	☐
j. *Financial Support:* The board contains a reasonable number of members who provide or help get financial support.	☐	☐	☐	☐
k. *Board/President Relationship:* There is an effective working relationship between the board and the president or chancellor and his staff.	☐	☐	☐	☐
l. *Accomplishment:* The board has a genuine sense of progress and achievement, and members derive satisfaction from their service.	☐	☐	☐	☐

2. What do you believe is the most outstanding *asset or strength* of your board as it is presently constituted and functions?

.....

3. Conversely, what is its major *shortcoming or inadequacy?*

.....

4. What do you consider the *general* effectiveness of the current board of this institution to be? (check one)
   - ☐ Clearly in the highest category for institutions of this type
   - ☐ Not of the highest order, but satisfactory
   - ☐ Less than completely satisfactory—at least in some respects—but adequate
   - ☐ In need of major change toward improvement of persistent problems

IV. Informational Needs of Board Members

1. How valuable would *additional* information be to you in each of the following areas?

	Extremely Valuable	Of Some Value	Of Limited Value
a. Good governance procedures in general	☐	☐	☐
b. Curricular innovations in other institutions	☐	☐	☐
c. Budgeting, financial planning, and maintenance practices	☐	☐	☐
d. Fund raising	☐	☐	☐
e. Trends in federal support of higher education	☐	☐	☐
f. Trends in state support of higher education	☐	☐	☐
g. High level manpower needs	☐	☐	☐
h. Personnel management practices for faculty and administration	☐	☐	☐
i. National trends in higher education	☐	☐	☐

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j. Legal challenges to board, and ways of coping with them	☐	☐	☐
k. Problems similar institutions are facing, and what they are doing about them	☐	☐	☐
l. Additional information from institutional sources on financial aspects: nature and extent of current indebtedness, proportion of operating costs coming from tuition, etc.	☐	☐	☐
m. Additional information from institutional sources on such matters as proportion of faculty with tenure, proportion of minority students in student body, etc.	☐	☐	☐
n. Other (specify ——————————)	☐	☐	☐

2. Toward improving board functioning, how promising or attractive would the following activities by a service organization appear to be in providing needed information or experience?

	Very attractive	Of some attractiveness	Of limited attractiveness
a. Workshops of introductory conferences to orient *new* trustees	☐	☐	☐
b. Brief and to-the-point reports for trustees and presidents	☐	☐	☐
c. Occasional forums for exchange of ideas and experience	☐	☐	☐
d. One or more national and coordinated research programs to study and report facts affecting the trusteeship	☐	☐	☐
e. Commissioned papers or think-pieces by outstanding presidents, trustees, or educational specialists	☐	☐	☐
f. Suggested readings of special interest to trustees from current publications	☐	☐	☐
g. Provision of specialized consultants on matters of concern to boards or presidents	☐	☐	☐
h. Are there other activities that you feel a service organization like AGB could provide to improve the functioning of your board or president? If so, please comment:			

.....

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